European Union Law ( EU Law) - What courts or tribunals mean
There are restrictions on who may submit a ruling request. It can only be done by a "court or tribunal." Court or tribunal has a fairly broad range of interpretations. (The ECJ has interpreted Article 267 itself, after questions presented to it by national courts under Article 267 procedure!) A forum does not always need to be called a "court" or "tribunal." The elements of Dorsch Consult In Dorsch Consult (Case C-54/96) [1997] ECR I-4961, the ECJ issued the following judgment: The Court considers a number of factors, including whether the body is established by law, whether it is permanent, whether its jurisdiction is mandatory, whether its procedure is inter partes, whether it applies the rules of law, and whether it is independent, in order to determine whether a body making a reference is a "court or tribunal," which is a question governed by [Union] law alone. This decision is crucial because it provides what could be called a "functional" standard for determining whether organizations are eligible to use the Article 267 procedure. Practically speaking, this means that more entities can request preliminary judgements than would have been the case had the ECJ taken a "literal" approach, which would have limited its response to petitions from entities that genuinely go by the names "court" or "tribunal." These are the benefits of this "functional" approach: Many organizations that do not go by the names of "court" or "tribunal" yet perform judicial duties, which entail resolving disagreements between parties. The functional approach helps to ensure that these organizations do not have to decide how to interpret EU legislation on their own, which in turn increases the likelihood that the legislation will be applied correctly to resolve the conflicts. The functional approach allows for more bodies to obtain rulings on various EU legal rules, enabling the ECJ to issue clear rulings on unclear EU legal provisions that might not have otherwise even reached the ECJ. In the national legal systems, the functional approach lessens the need for costly and time-consuming appeals. Decisions made by various bodies can frequently be appealed to "courts." Without a practical strategy, these appeals might be made in order to bring a case before a "court" and ask for a preliminary judgement. Any organization that performs judicial duties may request a decision on its own under a functional approach. Broekmeulen (Case 246/80) [1981] ECR 2311 is a nice illustration of the "functional" approach. A doctor's registration as Dr. Broekmeulen has been turned down. He used EU legislation as the foundation for his appeal to the Appeals Committee of the Royal Netherlands Society for the Protection of Medicine. There were several allusions to the ECJ, one of which inquired as to whether the Appeals Committee was a "court or tribunal." The ECJ ruled that the Appeals Committee, which carries out its duties with the approval of the public authorities and operates with their assistance, and whose decisions are accepted after contentious proceedings and are in fact recognized as final, must be deemed to be a court or tribunal for the purposes of [Article 267] in the practical absence of an effective means of redress before the ordinary courts in a matter concerning the application of [Union] law. In the following instances, the broad definition of "court or tribunal" can be seen: Crown of Denmark (Case C-400/93) Administration board in Copenhagen, Denmark; O'Flynn v. Adjudication Officer (Case C-237/94); [1995] ECR I-1275 [1996] ECR I-2617 - Gebhard v. UK Social Security Commissioner (Case C-55/94) Milan Bar Council v. El-Yassini (Case C-416/96) [1995] ECR I-4165 [1999] Immigration judge, UK; Abrahamsson and Andersson (Case C-407/98); ECR I-1209 [2000] Cadbury Schweppes v. Universities Appeals Board of Sweden, ECR I-5539 (Case C-196/04). [2006] Jia (Case C-1/05) v. Special Commissioners of Income Tax, UK, ECR I-7995 [2007] Torresi (Cases C-58 and 59/13) - Alien Appeals Board, Sweden, ECR I-1 National Bar Council, Italy [2015] QB 331; [2015] 2 WLR 29. In El-Yassini (1999), the European Court of Justice (ECJ) carefully considered the issue of whether a UK immigration adjudicator qualified as a "court or tribunal." Finally, it was decided that an adjudicator was indeed qualified. Read the following passage from the ruling and count how many of the Dorsch Consult (1997) criteria are met: 'It should be remembered that the Immigration Act of 1971 established the post of Immigration Adjudicator. The Immigration Adjudicator has the authority under this legislation to hear cases involving foreign nationals' rights to enter and reside on UK soil. Immigration Adjudicators are a permanent organ, too. They must make their decisions in line with the law, in accordance with the 1971 Act, and in accordance with the procedure. The nature of such process is between parties. Immigration Adjudicators must provide justification for their decisions, which are final and can, in some cases, be challenged before the Immigration Appeal Tribunal. The Lord Chancellor appoints Immigration Adjudicators for renewable terms of 10 years or one year, depending on whether they serve full- or part-time. They have the same independence protections while in office as judges have. So, in accordance with [Article 267], the Immigration Adjudicator must be viewed as a court or tribunal. On the other hand, it was determined that an independent arbitrator was not a court in Nordsee (Case 102/81) [1982] ECR 1095. The arbitrator lacked mandatory jurisdiction, which caused this. An arbitration tribunal is not a "court or tribunal of a Member State" within the meaning of [Article 267] where the parties are not required, in law or in fact, to refer their disputes to arbitration and the public authorities of the Member State concerned are not involved in the decision to opt for arbitration and are not required to intervene of their own accord. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled that questions submitted to it by the Italian Public Prosecutor were inadmissible because he did not constitute a "court or tribunal" in Procura Della Republica v. X (Case C-74/95) [1996] ECR I-6609. Additionally, a reference from a body inside the Swedish tax administration was ruled to be inadmissible in Victoria Film A/S (Case C-134/97) [1998] ECR I-7023 (it did not perform a judicial function). The body's work was strictly administrative in nature. If anything, the body worked to avoid conflicts in the first place rather than settling ones that had already occurred. If a court is performing an administrative (as opposed to judicial) duty, it might not even be considered a court. The ECJ determined that the District Court, Bregenz, Austria, was not a "court" when it was operating as a land register in Salzmann (Case C-78/99) [2001] ECR I-4421. Similar to this, the Regional Court, Wels, Austria, was not a "court" when serving as a company's register in Lutz & Others (Case C-182/00) [2002] ECR I-547. ECJ ruling: "A national court may only refer a question to the [ECJ] if it has a case pending before it and if it is required to render judgment in proceedings designed to result in a decision of a judicial type... Even if the other requirements [noted in Dorsch Consult (1997)] are met, the referring authority cannot be viewed as exercising a judicial function when it issues an administrative decision without being obligated to settle a legal dispute. The broad definition of "court or tribunal" has made it possible for a lot more organizations to use the preliminary rulings method. This has clear advantages: it allows the ECJ to explain the law on legislative provisions that could not have otherwise reached the Court; it enables those bodies to apply EU legislation after it has been interpreted by the Court; and it might even decrease the number of national appeals. However, one of the Court's own experts has consistently criticized the Court's policies. Several viewpoints, starting with De Coster (Case C-17/00), have been expressed. [2001] Repeated in Austrian Rundfunk (Case C-195/06) is ECR I-9445. [2003] Most recently, in Umweltanwalt von Kärnten (Case C-205/08), ECR I-4989. [2009] Advocate-General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer has expressed concern about the ECJ's "too liberal" view of "court or tribunal," which he claims allows administrative authorities outside of the "regular judicial system" to participate in the preliminary judgments process. He has asked the Court to define "court or tribunal" to include only "bodies forming part of the judicial power of every State," with very few exclusions, and to "set down a stronger and more consistent body of norms" on admission. However, the Advocate-counsel General's has (so far) been disregarded by the Court.
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European Union Law ( EU Law) - Inadmissible references: "Docket control"
Requests for preliminary rulings are infrequently denied by the ECJ. The ECJ is, in theory, required to respond if the issue being addressed is one of interpretation. There are three circumstances, nonetheless, in which requests for preliminary judgements have been ruled to be inadmissible. Contrived argument The ECJ declared in Leur-Bloem (Case C-28/95) [1998] QB 182: "A reference by a national court can only be rejected if it appears that the [Article 267] procedure has been misused and a ruling from the Court elicited by means of a contrived dispute, or it is obvious that [Union] law cannot apply, either directly or indirectly, to the circumstances of the case referred to the Court," according to the rule. In Foglia v. Novello (No 2) (Case 244/80), this circumstance arose. [1981] Case Example: ECR 3045 Case 244/80: Foglia v. Novello (No. 2) [1981] ECR 3045 A number of cases of an Italian liqueur wine were ordered by Ms. Novello, a French national, from an Italian wine dealer named Foglia. The sales agreement stated that Novello would not be responsible for any fees levied by the French or Italian authorities in violation of (Union) law. When the wine entered France, the French Customs officers reportedly levied an illegitimate duty on it. After paying for it, Foglia filed a lawsuit against Ms. Novello to try and recoup the money. The judge in the Italian court asked for a decision on how to read Article 110. The ECJ, however, declined to respond, claiming that the proceedings were "artificial" and had been fabricated by the parties to test the legality of the French tax laws. Although this ruling has drawn criticism, it is acceptable given that there was no actual EU law for the ECJ to rule on. In Meilicke v. Meyer (Case C-89/91) [1992] ECR I-4871, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) followed the precedent set in Foglia v. Novello (1981) by declining to consider a number of questions referred to it by the Hanover Regional Court because they were all related to Professor Meilike's theories regarding EU company law and there was no actual disagreement between the parties. The Court declared that Article 267's goal was to aid in the administration of justice in Member States, not to provide advisory views on broad or speculative issues. Despite arguments to the contrary by an interested observer, the ECJ has agreed that the debate was real in a number of following cases. For instance, the ECJ rejected the Belgian government's argument that a VAT dispute (between a Belgian company and the Belgian tax authorities) was fabricated in Idéal Tourisme (Case C-36/99) [2000] ECR I-6049, concluding that "the documents in the case contain nothing to show that the parties to the main proceedings manifestly colluded to obtain a ruling from the Court by means of an artificial dispute, as was the case in Foglia The documents clearly show that Idéal Tourisme and the Belgian State did not agree to send hypothetical questions to the Court for a preliminary judgement. Instead, it is obvious that the parties differ on a number of crucial points. In Bacardi-Martini v. Newcastle United FC (2003), the ECJ declined to reply to an English High Court's request based on circumstances that were comparable to those in Foglia v. Novello (1981). Newcastle United FC v. Bacardi-Martini (Case C-318/00) [2003] ECR I–905 A contract had been made between Bacardi and NUFC to promote the latter's goods on billboards at NUFC's stadium for a UEFA Cup game between NUFC and Metz in December 1996. However, NUFC backed out of the agreement when it learned that the match will be streamed live in France through satellite because French law forbids the advertising of alcoholic beverages on television. The High Court heard a case in which Bacardi sued NUFC and asked for a decision on how Article 56 should be interpreted (the free movement of services). The ECJ declined to take on the reference, stating that it needed to exercise "particular vigilance" if a court from one Member State requested a reference in order to examine whether the laws of another Member State was in compliance with EU law. Irrelevance The ECJ may reject the request if it relates to elements of EU law that are peripheral to the actual dispute. In BP Supergas v. Greece (Case C-62/93) [1995] ECR I-9883, the ECJ held that a request will be denied if it is "very evident" that the inquiry has "no relevance" to the underlying dispute at hand. insufficient background knowledge of the facts or the law In Telemasicabruzzo (Cases C-320 to 322/90) [1993] ECR I-393, the ECJ rejected a reference because it lacked adequate details regarding the parties' legal disagreement or the factual background. La Pyramide (Case C-378/93) [1994] ECR I-3999 provided confirmation of this, with the ECJ indicating that this would be the case particularly if the factual situation was complex. European Union Law ( EU Law) - references questioning the legitimacy of EU law
When the legality of EU law rather than its interpretation is in doubt, special considerations are required. First, the ECJ cannot decide whether the Treaties are legitimate. Therefore, the only EU legislation that may be contested on grounds of legitimacy is secondary legislation. In contrast to the first point, a national court cannot declare EU law to be invalid (Firma Foto-Frost v. Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost (Case 314/85) [1987] ECR 4199). The ECJ has sole jurisdiction in this matter. Therefore, a referral must be made when a national court believes a section of EU secondary legislation may be illegal. R (on the application of British American Tobacco) v Secretary of State for Health (Case C-491/01) [2002] is a nice illustration. ] ECR I–11453 British American Tobacco (on the application of) v. Secretary of State for Health (Case C-491/01) ) [2002 ] ECR I–1145 3 On the basis of Article 114 (Measures to Ensure the Functioning of the Internal Market) and Article 207, the Council had approved Directive 2001/37. (Common Commercial Policy) According to Article 1 of the Directive, its goal was to harmonize the laws, regulations, and administrative rules of the Member States regarding the maximum tar, nicotine, and carbon monoxide yields of cigarettes, as well as the health warnings and other information that must appear on unit packets of tobacco products, along with certain measures regarding the ingredients and descriptions of tobacco products, using a high level of health protection as a foundation. . The UK government's "intention and/or obligation" to transfer the Directive into national legislation was the subject of a judicial review request made in September 2001 by British American Tobacco and Imperial Tobacco. The application was supported by a number of arguments, including an improper legal foundation. The ECJ was consulted on the matter before rendering a decision, and in due course, the Court determined that Article 114 constituted the proper legislative basis and that the Directive was lawful. It was improper to apply Article 207 in addition, although this was only a formal error and had no bearing on the Directive's legality. European Union Law ( EU Law) - The national courts' function
After requesting a preliminary ruling, the national courts are expected to consider it in light of the circumstances of the case and render a decision. However, in the 2003 case of Arsenal FC v. Reed (Case C-206/01) [2003] Ch 454, Laddie J. of the English High Court declined to apply a preliminary judgement of the ECJ that he himself had requested. This case is now considered to be a landmark in legal history. The Arsenal Football Club claimed that Matthew Reed had violated its trademarks by selling scarves and jerseys outside of Highbury Stadium in north London that included the club's shield and cannon insignia. Laddie J had asked for a preliminary judgement about the interpretation of several clauses in Directive 89/104 during the course of the subsequent trademark infringement case. When the decision was made, however, Laddie J ruled that the ECJ had overstepped its interpretative jurisdiction and had reached certain factual conclusions (with which he disagreed) regarding the issue of whether or not Arsenal fans would be likely to mistake Reed's unofficial merchandise for Arsenal's official merchandise. If Laddie J was right, he was quite within his rights to draw this conclusion because, strictly speaking, the ECJ is only intended to render decisions regarding the interpretation of specific provisions of EU law. It was, nevertheless, a contentious choice. The partnership between the ECJ and the High Court avoided a serious crisis, nonetheless. After losing in the High Court, Arsenal FC moved to the Court of Appeal, which overturned Laddie J's ruling and determined that the ECJ had not exceeded its authority. As a result, the Court of Appeal fully applied the preliminary verdict and found in favor of Arsenal. European Union Law (EU Law) - The ECJ's role in the initial reference process
The ECJ is expected to be "reactive," which means that it should respond to inquiries from the national courts. Occasionally, the ECJ will adopt a more "proactive" stance and reword a query so that the guidance it provides to the national court is more helpful. Even less frequently, the ECJ will respond to a question that was never posed if it believes doing so will help the national court reach a decision. The case of Marks & Spencer v. Customs and Excise Commissioners (Case C-62/00) [2003] QB 866 is a nice illustration of this. The ECJ had been questioned by the Court of Appeal about Directive 77/388. The ECJ observed that the question was founded on the incorrect assumption of direct effect and, after educating the Court of Appeal on that matter, came to the conclusion that it (the ECJ) required to rephrase the question (otherwise the response would not make sense). The Court ruled that in accordance with the [Article 267] mechanism for cooperation between national courts and the [ECJ], the latter must give the referring court an answer that will be helpful to it and allow it to decide the case at hand. To that end, the Court might need to reword the query that was sent its way. The legitimacy of national law cannot be considered by the ECJ. In the event that it is requested to, it may either rephrase the question and provide an abstract response regarding the pertinent aspect of (EU) law (Costa v ENEL (Case 6/64) [1964] ECR 1141) or it may simply decline to respond to the question (see Foglia v Novello (Case 104/79) [1981] ECR 745; Bacardi-Martini v Newcastle United (Case C-318/00) [ Additionally, the Court is not intended to think about how national courts should apply EU law, but it has done so in the past by rendering "practical" decisions (Stoke-on-Trent City Council v. B&Q (Case C-169/91) [1993] 2 WLR 730). Given that the border between interpretation and application is probably fairly thin, this is not surprising. European Union Law ( EU Law) - language barriers
The topic of linguistic differences in EU law has been discussed by the Court on numerous occasions. In Stauder v. Ulm (Case 29/69) [1969] ECR 419, for instance, it was determined that "the necessity for uniform application and accordingly for uniform interpretation makes it impossible to consider one version of... text in isolation but requires that it be interpreted on the basis of both the real intention of its author and the aim he seeks to achieve, in particular in light of the versions in all [the] languages." European Union Law( EU Law) - The method of Interpretation Used by the EU
The ECJ is no different from any other court in the world in having a choice in how it approaches interpretation. There are three primary approaches: Literal. typical dictionary definition favored by English courts but rejected by the ECJ. This approach is unworkable due to the multilingual environment. Contextual. Consider EU law overall rather than simply the specific item of legislation. Purposive. Interpret the law in a way that advances the Union's goals the greatest. Due to the inclusion of a "preamble" outlining the goals and objectives of the legislation, EU legislation (whether primary or secondary) lends itself to this method. The ECJ typically adopts a "teleological" approach, which is a synthesis of the second and third techniques. The following excerpt from Re Adidas AG (Case C-223/98) [1999] ECR I-7081 summarizes the position: "When interpreting a provision of [EU] legislation, it is important to take into account not just the words used, but also the context in which they are used and the goals of the laws they are a part of." Preference must be given to one interpretation when there are multiple ways to read a provision of [EU] law but only one can guarantee that the provision will continue to be effective. The ECJ can modernize the law and respond to new social and political events by employing the teleological method. European Union Law ( EU Law) - A description of the reference procedure.
References requesting an interpretation of EU law A request for a decision on the interpretation of the disputed provision may be made whenever a dispute regarding the proper interpretation of a provision of EU legislation emerges during a legal dispute before a court or tribunal in one of the Member States. The case is put on hold by the national court or tribunal until the ECJ rules. Following the ECJ's ruling, the national court or tribunal continues where it left off by using the ECJ's interpretation of EU law. Because the ECJ's preliminary judgement creates a precedent that all Member State courts and tribunals must follow going forward, this is meant to produce uniformity or consistency in the interpretation of all EU law. If national courts were left in charge of interpreting EU law, they might all come up with different interpretations; instead, having one court interpret all EU law ensures that the same meaning is provided throughout the Union. Given that the EU currently has 24 official languages, this is probably the case. Every one of them contains a copy of the Treaties. There will inevitably be differences between all the different translations because translation is not an exact science; nevertheless, using the ECJ helps minimize the differences. Without the preliminary reference process, courts and tribunals in the Member States would have to interpret EU legislation on their own. As a result, there would be a very real possibility that the same articles of EU law would have different interpretations in various Member States. If that happened, the entire structure of EU law may start to fall apart. The Court has the authority to interpret clauses in both Treaties as well as "acts of the institutions, authorities, offices or agencies of the Union," which essentially refers to all secondary EU law (most notably Regulations and Directives). Additionally, it has the authority to decide how international agreements signed by such organizations should be interpreted (Hageman (Case 181/73) [1974] ECR 449]. For a "act" to be interpretable, it need not be immediately effective (Mazzalai (Case 111/75) [1976] ECR 657). European Union Law ( EU Law) - Involvement with Member States in Article 267 TFEU and the preliminary reference procedure
Any national court or tribunal in any Member State may ask the ECJ to interpret a provision of EU law by using the Article 267 procedure. The ECJ just interprets EU law; the national court then has the responsibility of applying the law, as interpreted. This is an important point to keep in mind. According to Lord Denning's explanation in Bulmer v. Bollinger [1974] Ch. 401 at the Court of Appeal: JUDGMENT "It is crucial to make a distinction between the tasks of interpreting the Treaty—to determine its meaning—and applying it—to apply its provisions to the particular case at hand. [First], the obligation to implement the Treaty. The English judges in our courts have the final say on this issue. They are the only judges with the authority to make the final decision in the case. They must gather the necessary information, articulate the issues, render a verdict in favor of one party or the other, and ensure that the verdict is upheld. The meaning and impact of the Treaty must be determined before the English judge can apply it. The English judges are no longer the final arbiters when it comes to interpreting the Treaty. They are no longer qualified to render decisions with legal force. The European Court of Justice is the highest court responsible for interpreting the Treaty. It is important to recognize that Article 267 does not provide for an appeals process. National courts or tribunals initiate it during the actual dispute. Because of this, the procedure is known as the "preliminary reference," and the Court's decisions are referred to as "preliminary judgements." The decisions are intended to help the national court or tribunal come to a final decision. Therefore, the national courts and the ECJ have joint jurisdiction. The national courts render decisions on issues of fact and national law; they also administer both national and EU law. Only abstract concerns regarding the interpretation of EU law are decided by the ECJ (as well as questions touching the legality of EU secondary legislation). Advocate-General Lagrange stated that the "provisions of [Article 267] must lead to a real and fruitful collaboration between the municipal courts and the Court of Justice with mutual respect for their respective jurisdiction" in the first-ever preliminary reference case, De Geus v. Robert Bosch (Case 13/61) [1962] ECR 45. Much more recently, Advocate-General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer used the following culinary analogy to demonstrate how the preliminary rulings system works in Gintec (Case C-374/05) [2007] ECR I-9517: The European Union manual clearly lays out the various ingredients that go into the recipe for a preliminary ruling, but theory runs up against the different conditions that arise every time the dish is prepared, such as the heat source, the pans, the state and country of origin of the ingredients, and even the cook's state of mind. While the national courts are ultimately responsible for the dish, the Court of Justice just serves as the crucial [Union] seasoning while remaining neutral in areas that do not directly affect it. However, the national and European components frequently blend together, forcing each to take on and perfect the flavors of the other in order for them to fulfill their respective roles. It is the responsibility of the Court of Justice to offer the [national court] some instructions by giving it a useful instrument for settling the disagreement, much like a trustworthy kitchen assistant who is unable to prepare an entire dish but serves as the chef's advisor. European Union Law ( EU Law) - Actions against institutions for damages under Article 340 of the TFEU
Paragraph 2 of Article 340 stipulates that in the instance of non-contractual liability, the EU shall make good any damage caused by the institutions or by its servants in the course of their duties in accordance with the general principles common to the laws of the member states. So, it is possible to understand how the Article 340 action and a specific kind of general tort action are related. However, it is important to keep in mind that five of the initial six EC members had civil liability laws based on the French Civil Code. As a result, it is more accurate to see liability under Article 340 as being based on this type of liability. In any instance, the Treaty stipulates that the CJEU shall hear any cases brought pursuant to Article 340. The circumstances for culpability and the requirements for claim admission are two important concerns to take into account. Admissibility In such claims, locus standi must necessarily be practically limitless. As a result, any individual—natural or legal—can file a lawsuit. The primary criteria for admissibility is that the person filing the claim can establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he has experienced harm as a result of an institution's or its agent's deed or omission. This prevented the action from being launched, for example, by a trade union on behalf of a member or members. Werhahn Hansamuhle v. Council (Cases 63 to 69/72) [1973] ECR 1229, the ECJ determined that the claim must be specifically stated against an organization or its employee. Therefore, it was impossible to make a claim against the EU as a whole. Five years from the date of the alleged occurrence that produced the damage and gave rise to the action should be the proper time limit for filing a claim. prerequisites for liability To make a valid claim, the following three conditions must be met: First, the occurrence of the applicant's damage: This could involve not only financial loss but also any kind of bodily harm, such as loss of profits as well as actual harm. The requirement in general is that the harm be certain, demonstrable, and quantified. Future loss is also recoverable, but under very specific conditions. A claim for a future loss was recognized in Kampffmeyer et al. v. Commission (Cases 5, 7 and 13 to 24/66) [1967] ECR 245 when contracts were already cancelled at the time the illegal measure was created. In some cases, even highly speculative and immaterial losses have been accepted: Case 145/83 - Adams v. Commission (1986) QB 138 As a result of his discovery that Hoffmann La Roche was in violation of EC [now EU] competition legislation when he was working for the pharmaceutical company, Adams notified the Commission as required by law. However, his wife hanged herself after he was detained for industrial espionage. This was acknowledged as damage that might be recovered and created liability. Second, the existence of fault on the part of the institution complained about: In this context, it suffices to demonstrate that the institution owed the applicant a duty that was later broken, as was the case in Adams v. Commission (1986). The CJEU may be less inclined to reach this conclusion, though, if the institution was directly involved in formulating policy decisions and committed judgment mistakes that contributed to the harm that was sustained. Case 5/71) Zuckerfabrik Schoppenstedt v. Council [1971] ECR 975 In this case, a regulation established actions to balance out the variations between national sugar prices and Community [now EU] reference prices that were effective as of a specific date. The applicant claimed that the criteria were incorrect and had cost him money, but he was unsuccessful in his claim. The ECJ established some standards for determining fault, known as the "Schoppenstedt formula": there must be a legislative measure that involves decisions about economic policy; this must involve a serious enough violation of a higher standard of legal conduct; and the higher standard of legal conduct must be of a type that was intended to protect individuals. Fault will only be apparent if all components are satisfied. Third, it must be possible to establish a link between the alleged action and the harm sustained: As a result, an action for damages under Article 340 cannot be brought simply because a damage exists. Liability cannot be established based solely on evidence of damage without also showing that the challenged institution's actions directly contributed to the damage. In this approach, it is evident that distance from the damage is a crucial consideration: Pool v. Council (Case 49/79), ECR 569 (1981). The conversion rates for sterling (UK currency), also referred to as "green rates," allegedly caused a cattle farmer in England to lose money. His argument was dismissed by the ECJ as being too speculative. |
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